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How schools influence students' academic achievements  








This paper proposes a behavioral model to study how schools influence students’ educational 
behavior and academic achievements. The school quality is then defined into two dimensions: 
the amount of market-valued skills schools impart and how well schools cultivate an educational 
identity. Using data from Add Health in the US, I test the major hypotheses from the theoretical 
model. On the one hand, school resources (average class size and teacher supply) and student-
level curriculum have some effects on the math GPA scores. On the other hand, educational 
identity  indicators  (school-level  happiness  and  participation  at  school  teams,  clubs  or 
organizations)  and  the  previous  math  GPA  scores  are  significant  determinants  in  students’ 
observable effort level such as absenteeism behavior, and through this channel both determinants 
indirectly influence math GPA achievement. These empirical results inform us that an identity-
based behavioral model adds to a rational expectation educational choice model in understanding 
the  widening  academic  achievement  gap  between  adolescents  from  different  socioeconomic 
backgrounds. The paper presents the limitation of using school resources to study the school 
quality and advocates a richer set of school quality measures.  
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Part I        Introduction 
 
Since the end of the 1970s, overall wage inequality and educational differentials have expanded 
in most OECD countries. This trend is coupled with a rise in the payoff to high education and 
skills as the demand for high quality labor exceeds the inadequate supply. Despite substantial 
increasing premiums to high education, the college participation rates in the US increase more 
sharply in the high income groups than in the low ones (Atkinson, 2003). The puzzle is why, if to 
improve education and skills becomes more financially rewarding, there are still high drop-out 
rates at high school among the economically disadvantaged youth. 
 
One  plausible  explanation  to  this  puzzle  is  the  ever  increasing  social  segregation  and  the 
important role it plays in the deterioration of schools in poor neighborhoods (Benabou, 1993). 
Burtless (1996) and Kozol (1991) point out that children living in a poor segregated community 
can only enter low quality schools with insufficient school expenditure on facilities, classes and 
teachers.  A  number  of  empirical  studies  have  investigated  the  impact  of  school  resources 
(characteristics of schools, school expenditures, class size, qualifications of teachers) on students’ 
academic achievement (Hanushek et al. (2006)).  
 
Two criticisms have recently been leveled with respect to the theoretical education production 
function underlying the current empirical studies on school resources and performance. The first 
one is that these school resources studies all test that the output of the educational process is 
closely related to school inputs. However, the added resources to schools in many countries 
actually can be ineffective as the market-valued cognitive skills such as mathematics and reading 
skills which one obtains from these school resources can be very low. Using micro datasets, the 
school resources literature has put a lot of efforts at studying the effects of class size, per pupil 
expenditure, teacher education and experience on the improvement of educational performance. 
Hanushek (2003) concludes that many of these empirical studies only focus on a small set of 
direct school input measures but empirically have not identified any noticeable impacts that lead 
to understanding the significant gaps between the advantaged and disadvantaged schools in the 
US. At the aggregate level, Hanushek (2003) reveals that real per student expenditure doubles 3 
 
from 1970 to 2000 in the US, and by contrast, the average performance of students who are 17 
years old in mathematics and reading is only slightly higher in 1999 than 30 years before.  
 
The second cutting-edge problem is that these school resources studies do not pay sufficient 
attention  to  students’  internal  educational  motivation.  It  is  often  implicitly  assumed  that 
individuals have a rational expectation of the future returns to educational investment at school. 
When  a  good  education  is  economically  rewarding  in  the  labor  market,  students  should 
positively react to this external incentive by making enough effort at the school. This assumption 
has not yet been empirically supported as future income expectations are heterogeneous in nature 
(Dominitz  and  Manski  (1996)).  A  number  of  empirical  studies  have  shown  that  preschool 
education,  family  socioeconomic  status,  peer  effects  and  non-cognitive  ability  greatly  affect 
one’s  educational  performances  (Hanushek  et  al.  (2006)  &  Heckman  et  al.  (2006)).  It  is 
suggested that these factors probably do not directly influence learning but are influenced by the 
school norms that affect motivations and behaviors of students. Akerlof and Kranton (2002) and 
Ji (2008) both argue that emotion such as self-esteem driven by an educational identity greatly 
influences  judgment  and  it  acts  as  a  motivational  input  into  the  schooling  decision  making 
process.  
 
Following the same approach, this paper firstly proposes a model which allows for a discussion 
of the relationship between school effects and academic achievements. School organization does 
not act as  a sheer place to impart cognitive skills but has its social settings and strategy to 
cultivate an educational identity through the interactions among school, individuals and other 
peers.  The  hypothesis  is  that  there  are  three  determinants  of  individual effort  and  academic 
achievement. They are the amount of market-valued cognitive skills which the school imparts, 
the  intensity  (salience)  of  educational  identity  the  school  promotes  and  previous  academic 
achievement. This behavioral educational choice model offers us some broader insights into the 
hidden problems of American schools. In particular, the educational identity dimension allows us 
to explain questions such as why peer effects and school social composition matter. To test these 
theoretical findings, I use a dataset from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. 
It provides detailed and comparable information such as current and previous math GPA scores, 4 
 
student-level math curriculum, school social composition, feeling of happiness and participation 
at school activities.  
This study distinguishes itself from other school studies in the following sense. It is the first to 
study  the  effects  of  schools  based  on  a  behavioral  education  production  model.  Instead  of 
assuming schooling production process as a black-box
1, it explores the hidden mechanisms and 
adds an important dimension—educational identity—to the empirical study of school quality. By 
comparing a set of different school quality measures, it shows the limitation of using school 
resources to determine the school quality and advocates a set of measures of school quality 
(student-level curriculum content, school-level happiness and participation at school teams, clubs 
or organizations).  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The following part presents a theoretical model and 
its  major  hypotheses.  In  Part  III,  the  paper  introduces  the  sample  data,  variables  and  the 
empirical strategy. Part IV discusses the empirical results and it finally concludes in Part V. 
Part II     Theoretical Model 
 
Schools are specialized organizations where students invest in their human capital. According to 
the standard human capital theory (Becker (1964)), individuals make choices of investing in 
human capital based on a rational benefits and costs analysis. When the returns to an investment 
exceed the costs induced, the individual will choose to invest in human capital. The behavioral 
model in this paper introduces a subjective utility term to the educational utility function. It 
assumes that the individuals not only considers how much they can earn in the future labor 
market with the human capital they accumulate at school, but also other non-pecuniary concerns 
such as self-esteem linked to academic achievements
2. To be specific, the utility function for 
student i at school j writes as, 
                                                           
1 There is a large set of studies in the economics of education literature. These studies have identified considerable  
impacts  of  peer  effects  and  social  interactions  on  students’  academic  achievement.  But  most  of  them  such  as 
Hoxby(2000)    treat  schooling  process  as  a  black  box  without  clarifying  in  which  mechanism  peers  at  school 
influence each other. From this perspective, the links between theoretical development and empirical work are not 
strong. Peers effects and interactions can probably work through two channels: (1) direct learning and knowledge 
sharing among students; (2) externality of motivation. This paper discussion the second channel of peer effects. 
2 The utility assumption in this paper is less strong. I don’t assume individuals have elaborate calculation of their 
future long term income from schooling. The utility presents here is a type of “cognitive-evaluative” view. 5 
 
Uij = IQiSij + qjv eij Sij − c IQi,eij                                                                    (1) 
Sij = Sij
0 + eijrj                                                                                                            (2) 
The student’s utility is composed of three parts as shown in the utility function (1).  Firstly, the 
student’s utility is directly determined by future income in the labor market. IQiSij is the wage 
the student  expects  to  receive in  the future labor market. These  economic  returns  equal  the 
student’s  productivity  level  which  is  only  determined  by  market-valued  skills Sij the  student 
accumulates from school and her innate cognitive ability IQi. The future market uncertainties and 
risks  are  not  taken  into  account
3.  The  educational  production  of  market-valued  skills Sij is 
described in function (2). rj represents the quantity of cognitive skills the school j imparts to its 
student at a particular time period t. It is only associated with the school teaching content and 
quality then. For simplicity, assume that students learn knowledge and skills only from their 
teachers and they do not learn from each other. The higher rj, the better the school is at teaching. 
For  student  i  at  school  j,  the  accumulation  of  cognitive  skills Sij then  equal  the  sum  of  the 
previous educational achievement Sij
0 at time t-1 and the product of the student’s effort input eij 
and the cognitive skills rj. It is noticeable that the educational production process does not only 
depend on school but also on efforts exerted by the student to gain cognitive skills.  Let Sij
0 > 0 
and  rj > 0.  
 
Apart from the economic returns and costs described above in function (1), the student also takes 
into account self-esteem concerns qjv eij Sij for engaging in schooling
4. To be specific, v eij  
indicates how effort level eij determines the subjective way the student values the cognitive skills 
Sij. She can then obtain from Sij a subjective utility v eij Sij. It is assumed that v(.) increases in 
eij, v(eH) > v(eL) . The higher the effort the student exerts in schooling, the higher she values it. 
Furthermore,  the  self-esteem  concerns  at  school  are  driven  by  the  educational  identity qj . 
                                                           
3 By contrast, in the standard human capital model, individual is assumed to have a rational expectation on future 
wage  benefit  from  skills Sij .  The  expected  wage  only  based  on  one’s  cognitive  ability IQi and  labor  market 
information on the wage distribution. The utility writes as Uij = Ew IQi  market information)Sij − c IQi,eij . 
4 In psychology, self-esteem reflects a person’s overall evaluation of her own worth. William James (1890) used the 
term "self-esteem" to refer to the way individuals feel about themselves which in turn depends on the success that 
they wish to accomplish. 6 
 
Assume that the educational identity  qj is a stable term in each school organization and students 
internalize this preference for schooling. Define qj as the intensity (salience) of this educational 
identity for every student at school j. Some schools have a higher qj than others. The higher qj is, 
the greater the subjective utility for schooling Sij is. 
 
For simplicity, the student chooses between a high effort level eH and a low effort level eL . 
Denote eij ∈  eH,eL   and eH > eL.  In equation (1), there is also an investment cost  c ∙ . It is 
related  to  the  student’s  cognitive  ability IQi  and  effort  input eij .  Assume  that c IQi,eH  >
𝑐 IQi ,eL   and  
∂c IQi,eij 
∂IQi
< 0.  
 
Finally,  to  maximize  the  utility Uij   in  utility  function  (1),  student  i  chooses eij = eH,when 
Uij eij = eH  ≥ Uij eij = eL ;  and eij = eL  otherwise.  The  specific  solutions  to  this  simple 
maximization problem can be expressed as follows: 
a)  when  rj ≥
c IQi,eH −c IQi,eL −qjSij
0 v eH −v eL  
IQi eH−eL +qj v eH eH−v eL eL  ,  (eij,v(eij)) = (eH,v(eH)); 
b)  when  rj <
c IQi,eH −c IQi,eL −qjSij
0 v eH −v eL  
IQi eH−eL +qj v eH eH−v eL eL   , (eij,v(eij)) = (eL,v(eL)). 
Obviously,  the  optimal  effort  level  is  influenced  by (rj, qj, Sij
0)5.  The  intuition  shown  in 
solutions a) and b) can be explained as follows. Given the level of the previous schooling Sij
0, the 
more cognitive skills rj the  student can obtain at  school,  the  greater external  incentives  will 
encourage her to make high level effort eH. She will not only obtain extra economic rewards in 
the future labor market,  but also higher self-esteem derived from a higher rj. Similarly, given the 
level of the previous schooling Sij
0, the higher the educational identity qj, the student experiences 
higher self-esteem utility, and therefore is more internally motivated to choose high effort level 
eH. The external and internal incentives rj and qj are mutually substitutable to achieve a high 
effort equilibrium.  
 
                                                           
5 The rational expectation human capital model predicts that given the level of cognitive ability, the individual effort 
level eij is only influenced by wage distribution in the labor market  and  school effects rj, but not by Sij
0 and qj. 7 
 
The relationship between rj and qj, for a given level of Sij
0 , is described graphically in Figure 1. 
The mathematical proof of Figure 1 can be found in the Appendix. I first set  Sij
0 = S1  , curve S1  
represents  the  boundary  between  the  high  effort  equilibrium  eij = eH  and  the  low  effort 
equilibrium eij = eL.  When rj = r∗, qj = 0.  When rj = 0, qj = qj
1.  As rj declines,  the  curve 
increases in qj . All points above curve S1 are combinations of rj   and qj that produce a high 
effort equilibrium while all points below curve S1 are combinations of rj   and qj that produce a 
low effort equilibrium. The figure informs us that as rj (or qj) increases, point (rj  ,qj)  is more 
likely to be above curve S1. It is noticeable that as long as the acquired cognitive skills rj > r∗, 
making high effort is optimal even when there is no internal motivation qj = 0.   
Figure 1.  𝐒??











Figure  1  also  shows  that  as  initial  skills Sij
0 rise  from S1 to S2,  the  boundary  curve  shifts 
downward from curve S1 to curve S2. When rj = r∗, qj = 0. When rj = 0, qj = qj
2. As a result, 
the area of high effort equilibrium becomes larger and the area of low effort equilibrium shrinks.  
A further increase of initial skills Sij
0 to S3 will enlarge the area of high effort equilibrium further. 
Likewise,  when rj = r∗, qj = 0.  When rj = 0, qj = qj
3.  The  intuition  behind  Figure  1  is  an 











student makes in schooling, the higher value she will put on the total schooling Sij
0 + eijrj. For 
example, when the previous schooling has increased from S1  to S2 , the differences in utility 
between making effort  eH  and eL are larger from S2  than from S1. As utility qjS2  v eH  −
v eL   > qjS1  v eH  − v eL   , the high effort equilibrium condition in a) informs us that the 
student is more likely to make effort eH when Sij
0 = S2  than when Sij
0 = S1 . 
Part III    Empirical Strategy 
 
1. Data and Variables  
 
The sample used for this study is from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. 
Beginning at the 1994-95 school year, it is a longitudinal study of a nationally representative 
sample of adolescents in secondary school in the US. Within each participant school, the In-
School Questionnaire was initially administered to all students who were present on the survey 
day.  All  students  listed  on  the  school  roster  are  stratified  by  grade  and  sex,  and  randomly 
selected. Racial and ethnic minorities are oversampled and finally a total core sample of 12,105 
adolescents  was  interviewed  at  home.  Some  students  change  or  exit  school  after  Wave  I 
interviews. In the 1995-96 school year, Wave II does follow-up in-home interviews with the 
same adolescents who are still at their schools. These surveys provide a wide range of topics and 
information on social and demographic characteristics of respondents (such as gender, race and 
grade, education of parents, family composition),  students’ assessment on the relationships with 
their  schools  and  teachers,  self-reported  academic  behavior,  performances  and  educational 
expectations at school. Other relevant datasets are also available for further and detailed studies.  
For example, administrators from participant schools complete self-administered questionnaires 
dealing with school policies and teacher characteristics. Moreover, in order to provide precise 
measures  of  math  academic  progress  (GPA)  and  high  school  student-level  curriculum,  the 
Adolescent Health and Academic Achievement study collected school transcripts for some Wave 
I respondents throughout their grades 9-12.  
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The sample in this study is selected from students in grades 9-12 who participate in the Wave I 
In-home interview.  Those with missing data on race, gender, IQ test, family and parents, school, 
student level math curriculum and math GPA scores are dropped from the sample. As the study 
is focusing on analyzing how school effects and previous math performance work on students’ 
math GPA scores and absenteeism behavior, it requires students’ detailed information on math 
curriculum and at least two consecutive math GPA scores during the academic years 1994-95 or 
1995-96. As a result, a large set of observations are excluded. Table 1 presents the respondents’ 
grade levels in the survey year 1994-95 and 1995-96 that were included in the sample. For a full 
list of variables, their definitions and sources in this study, refer to Table 2. The final sample is 
an unbalanced two-wave panel dataset with 5937 observations in total. Table 3 shows the sample 
structure:  in  Wave  I  there  are  3066  observations;  in  Wave  II  2871  and  among  them,  1571 
respondents attend in both waves. Summary statistics for the student-level variables including 
information on students’ characteristics and family background are displayed in Table 4. There 
are  77  schools  in  the  sample.  Table  5  shows  the  relevant  summary  statistics  of  school 
characteristics. This set of variables helps us to distinguish one school from another and defines 
the school quality. In order to measure the school quality that is crucial to this empirical study, 
the following aspects are taken into consideration.  
 
1. How much market-valued skills does the school imparts to its students? 
One  direct  way  to  measure  the  skills  students  acquire  at  their  school  is  to  assume  full 
effectiveness of teaching at each school and then to look at the student-level curriculum content. 
A comprehensive curriculum includes courses on math, science, English, social science, etc. It is 
assumed that through its curriculum the school imparts skills that make students more productive 
and better rewarded in the labor market. The reasons for using math curriculum in this study is 
based on the following two arguments: (1) Math courses play a critical gate-keeping role in 
adolescents'  academic  careers  in  high  school.  (2)  In  the  labor  market,  math  skills  are 
economically rewarded. Additionally, more-advanced math courses have greater earning effects 
than less-advanced ones. Rose and Betts (2004) find empirical evidence that specific high school 
math courses (vocational math, pre-algebra, algebra/geometry, intermediate algebra, advanced 
algebra, and calculus) have positive effects on earnings nearly ten  years after graduation. A 10 
 
varied math curriculum can explain the earnings gap between students of different ethnicities, 
socioeconomic statuses, and genders.  
 
The summary statistics of the measure of student-level curriculum I use are shown in Table 4. 
The student-level curriculum indicator is obtained in a straightforward way from the Adolescent 
Health and Academic Achievement study dataset. This indicator has been constructed using a 
standardization procedure which enables comparisons across schools and students.  It reflects 
both the complexity and performance expectations of curriculum content.  In the appendix, there 
are detailed illustrations of how the indicator is constructed.   
 
2. How do schools shape educational identity that encourages students to engage in schooling? 
Educational identity is an abstract concept and the intensity of educational identity qj at each 
school is not directly observable. I hereby use two proxies which can capture how well students 
identify themselves at school. One is the school-level happiness feeling and the other, as has 
already been proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2002), the school-level participation in school 
activities. In the Add Health dataset, all the students in each school are asked the following 
question towards the school they are studying in. “How strongly do you agree or disagree: You 
are happy to be at your school?” Additionally, all the students are asked to point out the clubs, 
organizations and teams in which they participate or will participate at school. I average these 
student-level  information  at  each  school  and  use  them  as  school-level  educational  identity 
indicators.  
3. Social compositions 
Recent  empirical  studies  on  schools  have  shown  that  schools’  social  compositions  (such  as 
parents’ socioeconomic status and skin color) matter to students’ learning and these effects can 
be substantially larger than the effects of class size and teacher supply (Hanushek et al. (2006)). 
However,  the  mechanism  through  which  the  school  composition  enters  the  educational 
production process has not been carefully investigated. One channel proposed in this theoretical 
behavioral model is that the social composition at school does not directly influence learning but 
determines school educational identity qj. Similarly, Akerlof and Kranton (2002) cite examples 11 
 
from  the  sociology  and  education  literature  and  suggest  that  schools’  black  and  white 
composition influence students’ attitude towards Math and English.  
qj  = Z Ij, F1j,…,Fkj , where  1,…,k  ϵ school j                                                  (3)                      
In equation (3), I assume a simple specification of how the school-specific educational identity 
qj is formed. The educational identity shaped at school j is not only influenced by the school 
organization itself Ij (i.e. teachers, administration staffs and all kinds of school arrangement) but 
also by the interactions among its students. Each student i is endowed with family impact Fij and 
then transmits it to other students through school interactions. In empirical studies, it is still 
unclear which aspects of the family socioeconomic background Fij significantly affect school’s 
educational identity. Therefore, I include socioeconomic information on schools’ white student 
proportion, migration proportion and mother college proportion in the empirical analysis to test 
the “educational identity” hypothesis. Tables 5 shows the summary statistics of these three social 
composition measures at the school-level. 
 
4. Other factors. 
Class size and teacher quality are assumed to be important determinants in the schooling process. 
Schools use resources to reduce the class size and attract good teachers. Smaller class size and 
better teacher quality concerning teaching experience, education degree and gender are expected 
to have a positive effect on students. This study considers that these efforts in using school 
resources  do  not  only  improve  the  teaching  quality rj  at  school,  but  also  create  a  school 
community Ij, as has been shown in equation (3), which aims at establishing an ideal educational 
identity qj and  helps  students  to  better  fit  into  education.  The  Add  Health  dataset  does  not 
provide information on class size and teacher supply that can be identified at the student-level, 
therefore I only include relevant variables at the school-level. The school-level teacher quality 
can be measured as the proportions of women teachers, new teachers, experienced teachers and 
high degree teachers. Table 5 gives summary statistics of a set of school-level variables.  12 
 
2. Empirical Model 
Using  the  dataset  described  above,  I  attempt  to  answer  two  empirical  questions.  The  first 
empirical question is how the effort  eij for student i at school j is determined. Following the 
theoretical model, the empirical model can be specified as, 
 eij = α0 + α1Fi + α2Aj + α3Sij
0 + α4IQi + α5rj + α6qj + ϵij                                (4) 
The dependent variable in equation (4) is a binary variable indicating whether student i skips 
class in academic year 1994-95 (or year 1995-96). In the survey, students were asked "during the 
academic year 94-95 (or year 1995-96), how many times were you absent from school for a full 
day without an excuse? ". The information on whether students skip class without excuse in the 
academic year can be regarded as an important signal indicating the student’s effort level at 
school. Define the student exerting high effort level eij = eH if he or she does not skip class and 
the student exerting low effort level eij = eL if he or she skips class. On the right hand side of the 
equation,  the  independent  variables Xij  include:  (1)  the  students’  demographic  and  family 
background  information, Fi ,  such  as  gender,  race,  grade,  mother’s  education
6 and  family 
composition; (2) the school information, Aj, such as average class and teacher supply, (3) the 
previous math GPA scores recorded in the school transcripts, Sij
0 , (4) the IQ test, as an indicator 
of one’s cognitive ability and scholastic aptitude, (5) the student-level math curriculum, rj, (6) 
the intensity of the educational identity qj at school j, which includes school-level of happiness 
and participation at clubs, teams or organizations, (7) other factors, the error term ϵij. Assume 
that the error term ϵij is independent and normally distributed, a Probit model then can be used. 
The hypothesized relationship is that the previous achievement Sij
0, the amount of market-valued 
skills rj the school imparts and the intensity of the educational identity qj all have a positive 










> 0                     (5) 
                                                           
6 Father’s education is not included in the regressors as there are more missing information in father’s education than 
that in mother’s education. Moreover, mother’s education is highly correlated with father’s education. 13 
 
The second question is answered using a reduced form model of how the math achievement is 
determined. Insert equation (4) into the educational production function (2). The empirical model 
writes as:   
Sij = β0 + β1Fi + β2Aj + β3Sij
0 + β4IQi + β5rj + β6qj + εij                             (6)               
The dependent variable is the math GPA scores student i achieves in school j during academic 
year 1994-95 (or year 1995-96). The same set of independent variables Xij as in equation (4) are 









> 0                                                                        (7) 
The  previous  achievement Sij
0,  the  amount  of  market-valued  skills rj school  imparts  and  the 




It is necessary to point out that both Sij
0 and rj enhance student’s final achievement Sij through 
two mechanisms. On the one hand, there is a direct and linear effect: Sij
0 and rj explicitly enter 
the education production function as is shown in (2). The current performance Sij reflects both 
the stock and flow of the accumulation of cognitive skills. On the other hand, there is an indirect 
and non-linear effect: by influencing student’s effort level eij as shown in (4) and (5), Sij












Figure 2. The Educational Production Process: Direct and Indirect effects 14 
 
again  but  indirectly  enter  the  education  production  function.  However,  the  intensity  of 
educational identity qj does not work in the direct mechanism and only influences the student’s 
motivation  to  make  high  effort.  Figure  2  depicts  the  direct  and  indirect  mechanisms  in  the 
educational production process at school. It also indicates that the behavioral approach adds 











Two potential problems can arise in the process of estimation when a pooled dataset is used. The 
first  one  is  the  cluster  sampling  problem.  In  this  particular  case,  the  error  term  is  not 
independently  anymore  and  identically  distributed.  As  shown  in  Table  3,  1571  students  are 
interviewed twice and in the pooled sample many students are repeatedly drawn from the same 
77 participant schools. Therefore, biases will arise in the estimates of standard errors. In order to 
mitigate the problem, I assume that errors within groups (i.e. school-level and student-level) are 
correlated and then I calculate robust standard errors in the regressions. The second problem is to 
justify the use of the pooled dataset before combining two-wave datasets. According to empirical 
model (6), I do a Chow test which shows that F (19, 5899) = 1.37 and P-value=0.1294. At 10% 
significance level we cannot reject the hypothesis that “if we run two linear regressions using 
Wave I and II datasets separately, the coefficients from the two datasets are the same”. Therefore, 
we can pool them together.  
Part IV   Results 
 
I start with the discussion on how school resources (class size and teacher supply) affect the 
students’ math GPA scores. Using this as a benchmark, I add information on previous math GPA 
scores, curriculum, school social compositions and school-level educational identity indicators to 
the regression of students’ math GPA scores as has been discussed in equation (6). Later on, I 
also run the regression of students’ absenteeism behavior in equation (4). This procedure helps 
us to disclose the direct and indirect effects in the educational process.    15 
 
1. What matters: school resources or curriculum-based school effectiveness? 
Column  (1)  of  Table  6  displays  the  regression  coefficients  measuring  the  impact  of  school 
resources on students' math GPA scores according to regression (6). Smaller class size and lower 
proportion of new teachers at school are significantly associated with students’ math GPA scores, 
while the percentage of female teachers, teachers with at least 5 years experience or with a 
master degree has no significant relationship with students' math GPA scores. Column (1) also 
tells us that students’ demographic characteristics (gender, race not including Hispanic, IQ test) 
and family backgrounds (unstable family and mother education) influence the math GPA scores 
significantly. 
 
Column (2) of Table 6, I include previous math GPA scores and student-level curriculum in the 
regressors. The R-square test shows that the inclusion of these two variables indeed raises the 
goodness of fit from 0.1306  to 0.3645 significantly. Firstly, the previous math GPA scores is 
crucially important. There is a strong linear relationship between the two consecutive math  GPA 
scores Sij
0 and Sij. Other things being equal, an extra point previous math GPA scores (ranging 
from 0 to 4) will add about 0.539 to the current year's math GPA scores. Secondly, improving 
the quality of the school curriculum brings a considerable positive impact on the students. An 
extra point of the curriculum (the curriculum ranges from 0.643 to 2.589 according to our sample) 
will add 0.255 to the current math GPA scores.  
 
Comparing Column (2) to Column (1) of Table 6, I find that the effects of a reduction in the 
average class size (from 0.013 to 0.012) and in the percentage of new teachers (from 0.515 to 
0.16) remain significantly positive. After taking the previous math GPA scores and the school 
curriculum effects into account, the marginal effects of the students’ demographic characteristics 
and family backgrounds drop sharply. For example, the effects of being Asian and Black become 
smaller and insignificant. The significant effect of being female decreases from 0.279 to 0.129. 
The  effect  of  the  IQ  test,  though  small,  drops from  0.019  to  0.009.  The  positive  effects  of 
mother’s education reduce from 0.193 to 0.079. Students in an unstable family perform relatively 
poorer than their counterparts in a complete family and this negative impact drops from 0.249 to 
0.135.   
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2. School-level educational identity: a missing dimension of school quality 
Compared to the school-resources regression shown in Column (1) of Table 6, the explanatory 
variables in Table 7 include comprehensive information about schools. School quality is defined 
into two dimensions: the curriculum-based teaching quality (separately discussed in Column (2) 
of Table 6) and the school educational identity. In Column (1) of Table 7,  I add the social 
composition factors (white, mother college and migration) into the regression. The effects of 
students' demographic characteristics and family backgrounds change accordingly. The major 
finding is that the proportion of students whose mother has a college degree has significant 
effects on the performance of the students. Other things being equal, if a student switches from a 
school where the mother with college degree proportion is 0 to a school where it is 1, the math 
GPA scores will rise by 0.393. The proportion of migrant students is also positively related to the 
math GPA scores but the impact is not significant. 
 
One finding different from the existing school literature is that the proportion of white students 
does  not  significantly  influence the students  in  school  math achievement.  Austen-Smith  and 
Fryer (2005) propose a two audience signaling model where for black students signals of good 
academic achievements  that induce high  wages can be signals  that induce black peer  group 
rejection. Furthermore, Ogbu (1997) argues that there exists an “oppositional culture” on the part 
of black students as black students feel conflicts and tensions between their own ideals and the 
dominating  white  ideals.  Akerlof  and  Kranton  (2002)  suggest  that  white  and  black  students 
composition at school influences black students’ academic attitudes and performances. To test 
the “oppositional culture” hypothesis among black students in American schools, I include two 
interaction terms “black*white student proportion” and “black*mother college proportion” in the 
regression. Both white student proportion and mother college proportion are good indicators of 
the strength of white culture.  If the black is influenced by his black and white peers  as the 
theories have suggested, we could see black students are sensitive to the social compositions in 
their school. However, Column (1) of Table 7 shows that black students do not perform poorer 
when the proportion of white students or the proportion of  mother college increases. These 
empirical results cannot support the “oppositional culture” hypothesis in the black and white 
achievement gap literature.  
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In Column (2) of Table 7, I add the school-level happiness and school participation into the 
previous regression. Both of the identity indicators are significantly associated with the math 
GPA scores. However, the effects of mother college proportion (coefficient from 0.393 to -0.077) 
become  insignificant.  Other  social  composition  variables  such  as  white  student  proportion, 
migration proportion and the two interaction terms remain unimportant. The F-test (Prob > F = 
0.4085) shows us that we cannot reject that the effects of the social compositions are zero. The 
insignificant  effects  of  school  social  compositions  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  social 
composition factors are correlated with the educational identity indicators school-level happiness 
and participation.  
 
Referring to specification (4), the potential correlations between the educational identity and 
social  compositions  are  already  defined  in  the  school  identity  specification.  To  test  the 
correlations,  I  run  two  regressions  of  educational  identity  indicators  on  the  school  social 
compositions and other school variables. The results are shown in Table 8. In Column (1) of 
table  8,  school-level  happiness  is  significantly  related  to  the  mother  college  proportion  and 
school size. School-level happiness increases by 0.79 if the mother college proportion increases 
from 0 to 1. The happiness level also improves from a medium size school to a large size one by 
0.143. In Column (2) of table 8, school participation is found to be significantly related to the 
proportion  of  new  teachers,  white  student  proportion,  mother  college  proportion,  migration 
proportion, school size and proportion in parents-teacher organization.  
 
In Table 9, it is found that private schools have significantly higher level of happiness and school 
participation  than  public  schools.  Akerlof  and  Kranton  (2002)  have  pointed  out  that  private 
schools are able to spend considerable resources to establish school community and ensure that 
students identify with the school and its ideals. I compare the two types of schools in the Add 
health sample and the results are shown in Table 9. Private schools indeed have smaller class 
size and school size, higher mother college proportion and parents-teacher organization than 




In Column (3) of Table 7, I show the final results of a regression of math GPA scores based on 
the behavioral model. Both the school-level happiness and school participation are significantly 
important to the math GPA scores. One point improvement in the school-level happiness (the 
range is from 1.793 to 3.208) adds 0.241 to the Math GPA scores. One point improvement in the 
school-level participation in clubs, teams and organizations (the range is from 1.157 to 3.657) 
adds 0.152 to the Math GPA scores. Moreover, student-level math curriculum and previous math 
GPA scores are also significantly associated with the math GPA scores. The marginal effects of 
the student-level  math  curriculum and previous  math GPA scores  are 0.243 and  0.529.  The 
estimated effects of school resources also confirm the results shown in the previous regressions. 
The proportion of new teachers is negatively related to the math GPA scores, the magnitude of 
the negative marginal effect has been reduced to 0.187. The average class size and percentage of 
female  teachers,  experienced  teachers  and  teachers  with  at  least  a  master  degree  are  not 
significant determinants of students’ math GPA scores.  
 
Moreover, in Column (3) of Table 7, the marginal effects of being female, Black, an unstable 
family and mother with college degree are respectively 0.126, -0.096, 0.087, -0.123, 0.07. One 
extra point IQ test is significantly associated with an increase in math GPA scores by 0.008. I 
don’t find any significant  impact of being Hispanic and Asian. The estimated marginal effects of 
the students’ demographic characteristics and family backgrounds drop sharply compared to our 
benchmark  results  in  Column  (1)  of  table  6.  This  confirms  the  view  that  there  are  no 
considerable differences in Math GPA scores among students with different races, genders and 
family backgrounds if the previous math GPA scores and school effects are properly controlled.  
 
3. Does the behavioral model explain the effort level? 
Table  10  shows  the  Probit  estimation  results  on  how  students’  demographic  and  family 
characteristics and school effects determine the absenteeism behavior during the academic year. 
Gender and IQ test scores are not significantly associated with the absenteeism behavior. Other 
independent variables being equal, Hispanic and Asian students are more likely to skip class by 
4.4% and 8.7%. To our surprise, being Black reduces the likelihood of skipping class by 7.4% if 
other factors are controlled. Being in an unstable family increases the probability of skipping 
class by 8.1%. Mother with college degree reduces the probability of skipping class by 3.2%. 19 
 
 
The most important results confirm the empirical hypotheses of the behavioral model in (4). 
Educational  identity  significantly  influences  students’  absenteeism behaviors.  Mother college 
proportion (not white student proportion and migration proportion) is found to be negatively 
related to the probability of skipping class, but after adding the school identity indicators the 
effect of mother college proportion disappears. At the mean level, the marginal effects of school-
level happiness and school participation approximately reduce the chance of skipping class by 
16.2% and 5.8%. Moreover, the marginal effects of improving the previous math GPA scores 
and student curriculum are 6.9% and 12.9% respectively. As both student-level curriculum and 
previous math GPA scores influence the students' effort level, this suggests that these two factors 
not only directly play a role in the education production function as equation (2) has described, 
but also indirectly influence math GPA scores through an effort choice mechanism shown in the 
empirical model (4) and (5). Note that the significant impact of previous math GPA scores on the 
effort level also informs us about the “endowment effect”. The behavioral model, therefore in 
this perspective, explains better than a standard model.  
 
Finally, school resources related variables also influence the absenteeism behavior. Larger class 
size, higher proportions of new teachers and teachers with master degree are all reported to 
significantly increase the chance that students skip class during the academic year.  
Part V Conclusion 
 
Schools  are  important  social  institutions  for  individual  development.  This  paper  provides  a 
behavioral framework to explain the relationship between the previous educational achievement, 
the school quality  and one's educational behavior and performance.  In particular, the school 
quality is defined with respect to the amount of market-valued skills the school imparts and how 
well  it  establishes  an  educational  identity.  In  the  theoretical  model,  students  adapt  their 
preference of schooling according to specific educational scenarios they face. The conditions 
under  which  students  fail  to  exert  a  high  effort  level  in  schooling  are  identified.  When  the 
previous educational achievement and school quality are poor, there exists a “low motivation and 20 
 
low  effort  equilibrium”.  The  school  quality  is  defined  into  two  dimensions:  the  amount  of 
market-valued skills schools impart and how well schools cultivate an educational identity. 
Using data from Add Health, I test the major hypotheses from the theoretical model and find that 
(1)  the  previous  math  GPA  scores  and  the  student-level  math  curriculum  are  significant 
determinants  in  math  GPA  scores  and  absenteeism  behavior;  (2)  the  educational  identity 
indicators (school-level happiness and school participation) play an important role in shaping 
students’ absenteeism behavior and their math GPA scores. The marginal effects of school-level 
happiness  and  school  participation  are  0.241  and  0.152;  (3)  School  social  composition 
(especially  mother  college  proportion),  school  size  and  parents’  involvement  at  school 
organization are found significantly related to the school identity indicators; (4) By contrast, the 
widely used variables such as average class size and teacher supply have quite limited marginal 
effects on education after controlling previous math GPA scores and school quality indicators.  
These  empirical  results  confirms  that  a  behavioral  empirical  framework  adds  to  the  school 
resources  approach.  This  proposed  framework,  especially  the  identity  dimension  of  school 
quality, provides some deeper insights of how socioeconomic backgrounds widen the academic 
gaps  between  the  advantaged  and  disadvantaged  youth.  This  paper  calls  for  more  empirical 
support.  Both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  progress  will  enhance  the  understanding  of  the 
"poverty trap  and low education" black box and help  to  evaluate  the effectiveness  of direct 








1. Mathematical proofs of Figure 1 
For a given Sij
0 , the curve between “the high effort equilibrium” and “the low effort equilibrium” 
S1 , S2  and S3 can be expressed as,   
rj =
c IQi,eH  − c IQi,eL  − qjSij
0 v eH  − v eL  
IQi eH − eL  + qj v eH eH − v eL eL 
 
When qj = 0, the effect of Sij
0 and qj disappear. The student chooses eij = eH as long as 
rj ≥ r∗ =
c IQi,eH  − c IQi,eL 
IQi eH − eL 
 
When rj = 0,  
qj
k =
c IQi,eH  − c IQi,eL 
 v eH  − v eL  Sij
0 ,    k = 1,2,3 and Sij
0 = S1,S2,S3 




 c IQi,eH  − c IQi,eL   v eH eH − v eL eL  + Sij
0IQi eH − eL  v eH  − v eL  
 IQi eH − eL  + qj v eH eH − v eL eL  
2 < 0 
∂2rj
∂qj
2 > 0 
Therefore, at curve S1(S2 or S3), rj decreases in qj and as qj increases, the slope 
∂rj
∂qj
 decreases.  
2. The building of student-level curriculum indicator 
 
According to the Academic Achievement study (http://www.prc.utexas.edu/ahaa/), student-level 
curriculum indicator is generated in two steps. Firstly, the textbooks used in each math course 
are coded. The textbook coding is based on curriculum framework developed for  “the third 
international  math  and science  study”.  The  curriculum  content is  categorized into numbers, 
measurement,  geometry,  proportionality,  function,  relations,  equations,  data  representation, 
probability,  statistics,  elementary  analysis,  validation  and  structure  and  others.  This 22 
 
standardization  procedure  enables  the  construction  of  curriculum  measures  that  allow 
comparisons of students' potential curriculum exposure across different types of courses within 
the same school, across the same course in different schools, and accumulated across years in 
high  school.  Secondly,  a  summary  indicator  is  calculated  considering  two  aspects  of  a 
curriculum.  (1)  The  complexity  of  a  topic  covered  in  a  textbook.  The  indicator  uses  the 
International Grade Placement (IGP) rating as a weight in calculating the curriculum content in a 
textbook. The more complex topics contribute more to the estimate of curriculum content, the 
higher IGP it has. For example,  curriculum “uncertainty and probability” have a higher IGP 
rating than curriculum “numbers” and therefore the former is weighted more than the latter to 
contribute to the indicator. (2) The performance expectations (PE). The indicator also relates to 
the review problems in the textbook, and range from routine statements of fact or execution of 
basic procedures to more challenging tasks such as solving a problem or communicating results. 
The performance expectation (PE) ratings then give more weight to material involving critical 





Table 1.  Respondents' Grade Level in Each Academic Year 
Add Health Survey       
In school  
& Wave I  Wave II 
   
Academic Year  1991-92  1992-93  1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  1995-96  1995-96 
        Grade 9  Grade 10  Grade 11  Grade 12 
      Grade 9  Grade 10  Grade 11  Grade 12   
    Grade 9  Grade 10  Grade 11  Grade 12     






Table 2.  Definitions of Variables 
Variable  Description  Dataset 
Student characteristics:   




Hispanic  If the race is Hispanic, 1 denotes yes, otherwise 0 
Black  If the race is Black or African America, 1 denotes yes, otherwise 0 
Asian  If the race is Asian or Pacific Islander, 1 denotes yes, otherwise 0 
White  If the race is non-Hispanic White, 1 denotes yes, otherwise 0 
IQ test scores 
Add health picture vocabulary test in Wave I in-home interviews. At the 
beginning of the Wave I in-home interview, respondents were given the 
Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test, a computerized and abridged version 
of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. In this test, the interviewer reads 
a word and the respondent selects the illustration that best fits its 
meaning. There are 87 items on the AHPVT, and raw scores have been 
standardized by age. It provides an estimate of verbal ability or scholastic 
aptitude.  
Grade10-12 
Grade10 (or Grade11) mean the student is in the 2
nd (or 3
rd) year at 






Family background:   
Unstable family 
If the subject does not live with either biological father or mother or both, 
we define it as 1, otherwise 0.  Wave I in-
home 
interview  Mother with a 
college degree 
If mother with at least a college degree, define it as 1, otherwise 0. 
 
Educational information:   
Math GPA 
The math scores in the survey academic year 1994-95 (Wave I) or 1995-96 
(Wave II). It is the average GPA of the math courses taken in that 
particular year. All the test results are recorded according to each 





Previous math GPA 
It is the previous math test scores on the students’ official transcript prior 
to math GPA in the survey year.     
Student-level 
curriculum 
An indicator of school quality, which measure how much math skills and 
knowledge students are exposed to in a particular year's math course-
taken. The range of the indicator is from 0.6432114 to 2.588921. The 
higher, the more valued. 
Absenteeism 
behavior 
An indicator of how much effort one put into study. Students were asked 
"during the academic year 94-95 (or  year 95-96), how many times were 
you absent from school for a full day without an excuse? " If the answer is 
at least one time, denote it 1; otherwise, 0. 
Wave I and II 
in-home 
interview 
School-level information:   








School size  1-3 which indicate small(1-400), medium(401-1000), large(1001-4000) 
Average class  The average class of school. It ranges from 12 to 38.  
New teacher  The proportion of teachers who are new in the school. 
Women teacher  The proportion of teachers who are women in the school. 
Experienced 
teacher 
The proportion of teachers who have at least 5 years experience in the 
school. 
Master or higher  The proportion of teachers who have master or higher degree in the 24 
 






The proportion of students who are white 
Dress code  Whether students must obey a dress code at 9




% of children with family in parent organization 
Mother college 
proportion 
The proportion of students whose mother has at least a university 
degree.  Using information from all the students at school, the average 





The proportion of students whose parents are both not born in the US.  
Using information from all the students at school, the average level at 
each school is calculated. 
School-level student 
feel happy at school 
It indicates the intensity of the educational identity or the salient of an 
educational identity at school level. The question is "How strongly do you 
agree or disagree: You are happy to be at your school? " The answer is on 
a 0-4 scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Using this 
information from all the students at school, the average level at each 
school is calculated. 
School-level student 
participation at 
school clubs, teams 
and organizations. 
It indicates the intensity of the educational identity or the salient of an 
educational identity at school level. The students are asked to give the list 
of clubs, organizations and clubs they participate or will participate. Using 
this information from all the students at school, the average participation 




Table 3.  Description of Sample Structure 
  Number of Observation 
Only in Wave I  1495 
Only in Wave II  1300 
Both in Wave I & II  1571*2=3142 
Total Sample  5937 















Min  Max 
Individual Characteristics: 
Female  0.53  0.546  0.538  0  1 
Hispanic  0.145  0.126  0.136  0  1 
Black  0.186  0.197  0.192  0  1 
Asian  0.12  0.105  0.113  0  1 
Grade 10  0.378  0.344  0.362  0  1 
Grade 11  0.399  0.38  0.39  0  1 
Grade 12  0.223  0.276  0.248  0  1 
IQ test  102.309 (13.528)  102.777 (14.478)  102.536 (13.996)  10  133 
Family Background: 
Unstable Family  0.364  0.347  0.356  0  1 
Mother with college degree  0.307  0.333  0.32  0  1 
Educational information: 
Math GPA scores  2.169    (1.16)  2.171  (1.178)  2.17    (1.169)  0  4 
Skip class without excuse  0.352    (0.478)  0.393  (0.488)  0.372  (0.483)  0  1 
Previous math GPA scores  2.4        (1.104)  2.359  (1.133)  2.38    (1.118)  0  4 
Curriculum  1.024    (0.192)  1.018  (0.192)  1.021  (0.192)  0.643  2.589 
 
Table 5.  Summary Statistics of School Characteristics (Number of Schools=77) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Private School  0.104  0.307  0  1 
Average Class Size  25.169  5.401  12  38 
New Teacher  0.101  0.137  0  0.99 
Women Teacher  0.584  0.161  0.23  0.96 
Experienced Teacher  0.642  0.239  0  0.98 
Teacher with Master or Higher Degree  0.473  0.239  0  0.95 
White Student Proportion  0.651  0.321  0  1 
Mother College Proportion  0.301  0.138  0.061225  0.829586 
Migrant Student Proportion  0.087  0.149  0  0.81658 
Feel Happy  2.531  0.249  1.793443  3.208333 
Participation at School Clubs/Teams/Organizations  2.276  0.513  1.156702  3.657408 
School Size  2.234  0.705  1  3 
Dress Code  0.701  0.461  0  1 
Proportion parents-teacher organization  0.214  0.239  0  1 
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Table 6.  School Quality and Math Performance (I) 
  Math GPA scores 
  Coefficient 
  (1)  (2) 
Female  0.279***    (0.027)  0.129***  (0.023) 
Hispanic  -0.121         (0.147)  -0.062        (0.063) 
Black  -0.245***  (0.094)  -0.083        (0.053) 
Asian  0.301**      (0.126)  0.104          (0.074) 
IQ test  0.019***    (0.001)  0.009***   (0.001) 
Unstable family  -0.249***  (0.046)  -0.135***  (0.031) 
Mother with college degree  0.193***    (0.054)  0.079**     (0.036) 
Average class size  -0.013*       (0.006)  -0.012**   (0.005) 
new teachers  -0.515***  (0.136)  -0.16*        (0.092) 
Women teachers  0.099          (0.233)  0.043         (0.166) 
teachers at school 5 years or more  -0.056         (0.156)  -0.041        (0.116) 
teachers with master or higher degree  0.05           (0.18)  -0.013        (0.117) 
Previous math GPA scores  --  0.539***  (0.023) 
Curriculum  --             0.255**    (0.1) 
Estimation  OLS  OLS 
Number of clusters (individuals)  4366  4366 
Number of clusters(schools)  77  77 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000 
R-square  0.1306  0.3645 
Number of observations  5937  5937 
R-Square test 
                                   ( 1)  Previous math GPA scores = 0 
                                   ( 2)  Curriculum = 0 
       F(2,  4365) =  300.37 
   Prob > F =    0.0000 
Conclusion: Statistically Significant Increase in R-Square 
Additional to the coefficients of the estimations, in the table, robust standard error are shown in the parentheses. 











Table 7.  School Quality and Math Performances (II): Adding Identity Indicators 
  Math GPA scores 
Variable  Coefficient (Robust Std. Err.) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Female  0.129*** (0.022)  0.127***(0.022)  0.126***(0.022) 
Hispanic  -0.024       (0.052)  -0.037      (0.053)  -0.052     (0.062) 
Black  -0.142       (0.137)  -0.174      (0.126)  -0.096**(0.044) 
Asian  0.105        (0.064)  0.1            (0.063)  0.099       (0.061) 
IQ test  0.008*** (0.001)  0.008***(0.001)  0.008***(0.001) 
Unstable family  -0.128***(0.031)  -0.122***(0.031)  -0.123***(0.031) 
Mother with college degree  0.07*        (0.036)  0.076**   (0.035)  0.07**     (0.035) 
Average class size  -0.008      (0.005)  -0.001     (0.006)  -0.004       (0.006) 
new teachers      -0.286**  (0.12)  -0.19        (0.117)  -0.187*   (0.102) 
female teachers  0.085        (0.188)  0.065       (0.168)  0.146      (0.164) 
teachers at school 5+ years       -0.041      (0.11)  0.026       (0.097)  0.031      (0.106) 
teachers with master+ degree      -0.062      (0.111)  -0.041      (0.102)  -0.04        (0.101) 
Previous math GPA scores  0.532***(0.023)  0.528***(0.024)  0.529***(0.024) 
Curriculum  0.271***(0.103)  0.264***(0.102)  0.243**  (0.099) 
White student proportion  0.003       (0.117)  -0.021      (0.098)  -- 
Mother college proportion  0.393***(0.148)  -0.077      (0.182)  -- 
Migration proportion  -0.2          (0.136)       -0.147      (0.15)  -- 
Black*white student proportion  0.097       (0.161)  0.223      (0.147)  -- 
Black*Mother college proportion  0.059       (0.388)        0.013      (0.34)  -- 
School-level feel happy  --  0.309***(0.099)  0.241***(0.091) 
School participation  --  0.14*** (0.054)  0.152***(0.044) 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Number of clusters (individuals)  4366  4366  4366 
Number of clusters(schools)  77  77  77 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
R-square  0.3660  0.3699  0.3692 
Number of observations  5937  5937  5937 
Additional to the coefficients of the estimations, in the table, robust standard error are shown in the parentheses. 
*** indicates significant level at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
--  F test: (1)  White student proportion = 0;  (2)  Mother college proportion = 0; (3)  Migration proportion = 0; (4)  Black*white 
student proportion = 0; (5)  Black*Mother college proportion = 0. Results: F(5, 4365) =1.01 and  Prob > F = 0.4085. We 








Table 8.  School factors on School-level Happiness and Participation  
Variable  School-level Happiness  School Participation 
  (1)  (2) 
Private school  0.008         (0.097)      0.113       (0.235) 
Average class size  0.001         (0.006)  -0.004        (0.01) 
new teachers  -0.071       (0.145)  -0.941***   (0.296) 
female teachers   0.27         (0.205)  -0.363         (0.362) 
teachers at school 5 years or more  -0.001       (0.095)  0.005          (0.166) 
teachers with master or higher degree  -0.088       (0.126)  -0.094         (0.154) 
White student proportion  0.056        (0.091)  0.333**      (0.134) 
Mother college proportion  0.79***    (0.249)  1.467***    (0.416) 
Migration proportion  0.394         (0.196)          -0.69***     (0.25) 
School size  -0.143***(0.045)  -0.276***   (0.068) 
School dress code               -0.011       (0.06)  0.068          (0.084) 
Proportion parents-teacher organization               -0.175       (0.16)  0.798***   (0.188) 
Estimation  OLS  OLS 
Prob > F  0.0002  0.0000 
R-square  0.3099  0.5846 
Number of schools  77  77 
Additional to the coefficients of the estimations, in the table, robust standard error are shown in the parentheses. 
*** indicates significant level at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
Table 9.  Private and Public Schools  
  Private School  Public School  Mean comparison 
School-level Happiness  2.766  2.504  +*** 
School-level Participation  2.837  2.211  +*** 
Average class size  20.625  25.696  - *** 
New teachers  0.196  0.09                 +** 
Female teachers  0.59  0.583                 +  
Teachers at school 5 years or more  0.464  0.663                 -** 
Teachers with master or higher degree  0.39  0.483                 - 
White student proportion  0.656  0.651                + 
Mother college proportion  0.468  0.282  +*** 
Migration proportion  0.119  0.083                + 
School size  1.5  2.319                 -*** 
School dress code  0.875  0.681                + 
Proportion parents-teacher organization  0.324  0.202                +* 
Number of Observations  8  69   
+ indicates private school>public school; - indicates public school>private school 




Table 10.  School Quality and Absenteeism 
  Skip class (yes= 1, no= 0) 
Variable   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
Mean  dF/dx 
Female#     -0.011  0.03  --  -0.004 
Hispanic#  0.117*  0.064  --  0.044 
Black#     -0.203***  0.061  --  -0.074 
Asian#    0.227**  0.108  --  0.087 
IQ test  0.001  0.001  102.535  0 
Unstable family#      0.216***  0.042  --  0.081 
Mother with college degree#  -0.085**  0.042  --  -0.032 
Average class size     0.026***  0.006  27.02  0.01 
new teachers   0.275**  0.111  0.105  0.103 
female teachers  0.25  0.182  0.541  0.094 
teachers at school 5 years or more  -0.103  0.24  0.63  -0.039 
teachers with master or higher degree   0.402**  0.161  0.422  0.15 
Previous math GPA scores    -0.184***  0.028  2.38  -0.069 
Curriculum    -0.346***  0.126  1.021  -0.129 
School-level feel happy    -0.434***  0.125  2.531  -0.162 
School Participation     -0.154**  0.071  2.046  -0.058 
Estimation  Probit 
Number of clusters (individuals)  4366 
Number of clusters (schools)  77 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Pseudo R-square  0.0829 
Number of observations  5937 
*** indicates significant level at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
(#) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; other dF/dx calculates the marginal effects at the means of 
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